ABSTRACT Nowadays, there is a rapid development of smart sensor network solutions. To prevent potential malicious attacks and make sure that the activities of devices are correct, there is a pressing need to ensure the software integrity of devices in the large-scale, dynamic, and self-organization swarm. Different from those single device attestation studies, Asokan et al. are the first to consider the secure swarm attestation problem and provide implementations based on two remote attestation architectures for embedded systems. However, their scheme could not provide a correct attestation result with dynamic swarm topology. Also, their scheme could not prevent a malicious device from launching a new attestation, and the adversary can use this weakness to conduct energy exhausting attack. In this paper, we mainly focus on secure and efficient identity attestation of compromised devices over swarm with dynamic topology and design an interactive swarm attestation scheme. Furthermore, we introduce multi-hop attestation security in swarm attestation and provide a verifiable solution for new attestation launching solution based on the one-way hash chain. Moreover, theoretical and practical analyses prove that our scheme is secure and efficient in attestation security and energy saving for dynamic swarm topology.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, a billion-plus connected smart devices and machines worldwide enable the Internet of Things (IoT) to provide vast amounts of collected data in near real time. Explosive IoT Spending will reach $1.7 Trillion in 2020 [1] . Organizations can use the collected information to create new operating models, bring new products to market faster, and develop more efficient business processes, such as object tracking applications [2] , energy harvesting applications [2] , and sensor deployment applications [3] , [4] .
The nodes of the IoT is usually tiny and battery operated embedded devices, and sometimes they are deployed in potentially harsh and remote environments, which bring many challenges for the IoT [5] - [7] . The most important challenges are the trust, security and privacy management of IoT, such as authentication, data integrity and secrecy, and privacy about data collection and data mining. To ensure these properties, one solution is to provide operation correctness guarantee over devices, which asks to maintain the software integrity of devices.
Motived by these needs, many attestation schemes [8] , [9] and architectures [10] - [13] have been designed and implemented to verify a remote device is in the correct state. Basically, we can divide attestation schemes into two settings: software-based attestation [14] - [21] and hardwarebased attestation [12] , [13] , [22] , [23] . Commonly, in these schemes, one entity, called prover, proves to another entity, called verifier, that the local software state is known and trustworthy. According to our knowledge, most researches focus on the attestation of a single device and only one scheme focuses on the attestation of multiple devices in a swarm [24] , which is called swarm attestation by the authors. However, the proposed swarm attestation scheme relies on some assumptions that the devices can negotiate shared secret keys with their neighbors and these shared secret keys will still be secure when these devices are compromised. It means that the shared secret keys are needed to be protected by the secure hardware, which increases the secure storage overhead. Also, the authors consider the network topology is static during the attestation. When applied to swarm with dynamic topology, the attestation scheme will not be able to return a correct result, even the mobile devices can rejoin the network. For example, in SEDA [24] , if a device lived within the communication range of its parent device, it will be considered as being compromised since the device can not rejoin the swarm and reply its attestation result. More importantly, if the leaving device is an inter node of the swarm spanning tree, the children node rooted in the device will not be attested by rejoining the swarm. Thus, it is impractical for the swarm with dynamic devices, especially when the swarm device number is large. Finally, the authors do not consider the attestation launching problem, which means that any device (even malicious one) can launch a new attestation of the network, which may be used by attackers to launch energy exhausting attack.
In this paper, we aim to explore secure and efficient attestation scheme, which can correctly return the device status and identity of malicious devices over swarm with dynamic topology (even during attestation). It means that, our scheme should mitigate the affection of dynamic swarm topology and potential compromise of devices to some extent and return correct attestation results in each round of swarm attestation. Theoretically, we construct a secure swarm attestation scheme against a stronger adversary, which can even compromise the shared secret key among network initialization phase. Also, different from all previous signal device attestation or swarm attestation schemes, we provide the security analysis of our scheme, which is the first to consider the affection of malicious verifier problem during the attestation. Moreover, we introduce the one-way hash chain technology to provide efficient and verifiable way to check the coming of the new attestation. We need to remark that, softwarebased attestation schemes relying on tight time constraints are usually considered by researchers. However, these schemes are not suitable for remote attestation [25] , let alone the attestation of multi-hop attestation of a network. Thus, similar to the existing swarm attestation scheme [24] , we also assume the hardware support in our swarm attestation scheme.
In a summary, we make the following contributions in this work:
-We explore secure and efficient swarm attestation supporting compromised devices identification with dynamic swarm topology and design our µSEDA scheme. Also, we figure out launching attacks in the swarm attestation and provide a verifiable way to solve the problem based on cryptography one-way hash chain. -We present the secure model of dynamic swarm attestation against strong devices computerization attack, where the shared secure keys are leaked to attackers. Furthermore, based on the security model, we are among the first to consider the security of multi-hop attestation with compromised verifiers and design verifiable accumulation algorithm to prevent the malicious activities of compromised verifier. -Theoretically, we provide the security analysis of our scheme in the multi-hop swarm attestation. In our analysis, the swarm attestation is a recursive device attestation over the spanning tree, and we prove our scheme is secure in different situations, even with malicious verifiers in each hop.
II. RELATED WORKS
Asokan et al. [24] first consider the challenges of remote swarm attestation, and propose a scalable protocol called SEDA. In SEDA, embedded devices are equipped with the minimal hardware requirements necessary for attestation. It allows the verifier to perform attestation over a spanning tree rooted at the verifier. During the attestation, each device attests its neighbors, and reports the results back to its parent.
To improve the resiliency of SEDA, DARPA is designed by Ibrahim et al. [26] to collaboratively detect stronger attack with hardware-compromised devices. To provide publicly verifiability, Ambrosin et al. [27] proposed an end-to-end protocol for collective attestation. Since the scheme does not require all the devices to be equipped with trusted execution environments, it is suitable for heterogeneous deployments. Recently, by assuming the full connectivity among devices during attestation, Carpent et al. improve SEDA with respect to scalability and resiliency to hardware attacks. Kohnhäuser et al. [28] introduce cluster election mechanism in SEDA to support more dynamic networks in recent work.
More recently, Ibrahim et al. [29] propose a scheme called SeED, which leverages SEDA to perform a prover-initiated series of attestation step at different random time points for different applications. Carpent et al. [30] propose a remote swarm attestation scheme called ERASMUS based on SEDA, which is used to identify mobile adversaries between two successive attestation periods with less prover's computation. Based on the concept of non-interactive attestation, Ambrosin et al. [31] propose a secure and efficient collective attestation scheme for large networks of smart devices with unstructured or dynamic topologies.
III. REMOTE ATTESTATION
A. SYSTEM MODEL Our network model is similar to that in [24] , where a swarm S consists of a set of low-end devices {D 0 , D 1 , . . .}, as shown in Fig. 1 . In our system, devices are usually of identical hardware and software configuration initialized and deployed by a trusted swarm operator OP. However, these devices are allowed to be of different hardware and software configuration for different utilities. We need to mention that each device in the swarm is trustworthy and the software configuration running in each device is certified by OP in the device initialization and development phase. The devices in S can be both static and mobility, which means that swarm S can be dynamic in both topology and device membership. In this paper, we focus on dynamic swarm. The goal of swarm attestation is to allow a remotely trusted verifier VRF to efficiently make sure that software configuration of the swarm is integrated as expected and securely reflects which node is malicious. The swarm attestation guarantees that the verifier obtains the number of devices and exactly learns the identities of compromised ones taking part into attestation. We need to remark that the devices that do not respond to the protocol during attestation (e.g. out of communication range, software or hardware failure, or malicious attack) can not be attested. However, since the mobility of devices and the character of wireless communication, we do not simply consider the irresponsive devices as compromised nodes. The reason is that the compromised nodes are those which take part into the attestation while not able to pass the attest. Different from that the irresponsive nodes may be honest ones, which are not able to take part into attestation. We consider the attestation of the irresponsive nodes in the multi-round attestation stage.
B. OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENTS
Asokan et al. [24] introduced five properties for swarm attestation, which can be summarized as remote verify integrity, efficiency, swarm topology in-dependency, concurrency and attestation in-dependency. In this paper, we consider that a secure swarm attestation scheme should also have the following additional properties:
1. Malicious device identification: Swarm attestation should correctly return the identities of devices which are compromised. 2. Mobility tolerance: The attestation protocol should be efficient and it can tolerate device mobility to some extent. It means that the attestation scheme can efficiently and securely attest the swarm as long as the mobile node could re-join the attestation with different joining point. 3. Verifiable attestation launching: Only honest verifiers can launch a new swarm attestation. In our scheme, the spanning tree structure is adopted for swarm attestation, where parent devices in the spanning tree can collect the attestation results of their child devices. It is important to provide the identities of malicious devices, which is important to improve the survivability of a swarm through revoking, resetting or redeveloping activities. Also, we need a non-repudiation way to guarantee that a malicious node can not forge a fault attestation result of a device and the attestation result collected by a device (even malicious) can not be denied. Moreover, the mobility of swarm device and the wireless communication property will make device frequently leave/join a swarm. At least, the swarm topology and the parent-children relationship can be dynamic even during the swarm attestation. Thus, we need mobility tolerance property to minimize the affection over swarm attestation. Finally, to prevent a malicious device from launching fake attestation to its children devices, we need an efficient and verifiable attestation launch guarantee.
C. ADVERSARY MODEL AND ASSUMPTIONS
In our system, we mainly consider software-based attacks, and we do not specify how and when the devices in the swarm might be compromised. Once a device is compromised, the adversary will have full control over the software executing on the device, such as schedule interrupts at will, accessing readable storage (e.g. ROM) and modifying the writable storage (e.g. flash, RAM, and cash). The only restriction is guaranteed by the minimal hardware approach [12] , [13] , [25] , where the adversary can not write to ROM or force an interrupt when the interruption is disabled. Also, we assume that the adversary will not perform hardware modification to the devices in the swarm, which means that it will not change the digital logic, exchange new CPU or add more memory. However, it is possible for an adversary to adopt some external hardware support to conduct some attacks for remote attestation. This means that the adversary considered can temper the software of any targeted device in the swarm.
We make no assumption over the verifier VRF. However, we assume that all the devices(prover or verifier) in the swarm are ordinary low-end embedded devices. If a device is compromised, the adversary can control all the activities and obtain the private message stored in the device (containing the shared secret key between neighbors), except the activities and content protected by the secure hardware. Different from device attestation, we need to conduct remote attestation over the swarm. Thus in our scheme, we figure out the unauthorized swarm attestation attack and selective attestation jamming attack. The first attack can be launched since the SEDA scheme [24] does not provide attestation launching authentication among multi-hop devices. It means that, only the accessing point device can verify the coming of new Since the attestation result of a device can be known before being sent to the secure hardware, a malicious verifier in the swarm can filter the attestations from malicious devices and only send the attestation from honest devices to secure hardware.
swarm attestation because the VRF is assumed to be honest in the adversary model. Then, any malicious node can claim the coming of new swarm attestation, which can be used to conduct energy exhausting attack [32] , [33] .
Selective attestation jamming attack is conducted by compromised devices in the swarm, as shown in fig. 2 . We leave the protection against Denial-of-service (DoS) attack to other research [34] , [35] . Since we consider a strong adversary, we make no assumption over communication security and latency during attestation.
Finally, we do not consider some effective attacks over low-end embedded device such as inferring keys from measuring power consumption or incorrect instruction execution from power glitches. We assume that they are out of the scope of this paper. Moreover, we also rule out the software vulnerabilities and implementation flaws of adopted devices (especially the devices in the swarm).
IV. PRELIMINARIES
A. SIGNATURE SCHEME We assume that there exists a signature scheme that is unforgeable under a chosen-message attack. In practical, we consider a more efficient construction for embedded system, such as ECDSA [36] .
B. MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODE
We adopt a cryptographic secure keyed hash function. A more practical construction of such hash function can be constructed from HMAC [37] .
C. ONE-WAY HASH FUNCTION
We assume that there exists a secure collision resistant hash function. A practical example is SHA-1 [38] .
D. REVERSE HASH CHAIN
Many protocols need to commit to a sequence of random values. One-way chain, which is called reverse hash FIGURE 3. Reverse Hash Chain. The reverse hash chain is generated from a randomly selected seed r n by repeatedly applying the one-way hash function h. The value utilization of the reverse hash chain is in the opposite order.
chain, is a widely-used cryptographic primitive. The first to uses the reverse hash chain was for onetime passwords by Lamport [39] . Fig. 3 shows the construction of reverse hash chain. It is a sequence of hash values < r 0 , r 1 , . . . , r n >. The seed value r n is randomly chosen. All other values are derived from it as follows:
Here, h is a cryptography secure hashfunction such as SHA-1 [38] . The chain is generated from r n to r 0 , while used from r 0 to r n .
E. INTERACTIVE PROTOCOL
Since all the protocols in our system running between two devices. The two devices interact with each other and get their outputs based on their inputs, respectively. Thus, we describe the interactive protocols with the following expression:
It denotes an event that parties P a and P b run a two-party interactive protocol , where in x and out x denote the input and output of party P x .
V. SWARM ATTESTATION PROTOCOL
In this section, we provide the detailed construction of our swarm attestation scheme µSEDA, which has two phase: initialization phase and attestation phase. The initialization phase contains device initialization protocol InitDev and swarm initialization protocol InitSwarm. Usually, initialization phase executes only once. However, we need to remark that the InitSwarm protocol between devices may execute multiple times caused by node mobility. The attestation phase usually needs to run multiple times during the lifetime of a swarm, which contains device attestation AttDev and swarm attestation AttSwarm. AttSwarm is launched by a trusted verifier VRF, during which it accumulates the attestation results from each device with AttDev protocol running between parents and their children in the swarm. An example network model is shown in Fig. 1 , where a swarm, in which each device with an expected device software state, is initialized and developed by a trusted operator OP. The VRF can periodically attest the swarm, which is a nine-device swarm containing two malicious devices. We need to remark that the malicious devices can also be a verifier in the spanning tree.
A. INITIALIZATION PHASE 1) DEVICE INITIALIZATION
We assume that OP is a trusted swarm initializer and developer, which has a public/private key pair (pk OP , sk OP ). The private key sk OP is kept privately while the public key pk OP is publicly known and initialized to each device in the swarm. It can be later used to verify the certificate parameters (e.g. the state and identity) from other devices. Also, OP generates a (n + 1)-element reverse hash chain < r 0 , r 1 , ..., r n > from a randomly chosen seed r n as shown in Fig. 3 . Then, OP initializes each device with the first value r 0 . 1 We need to remark that, OP will issue later values in the reverse hash chain to a legal verifier for launching swarm attestation in a verifiable way. 2 Here, r 0 is the initial value of verifiable section identifier for attestation.
Each device D i in a swarm is initialized and deployed by the OP with a designed device state s i . Also, there is a certification cert(s i ) signed by OP, which is used to prove that s i is predeclared by OP. Moreover, D i is initialized with a public/private key pair (pk i , sk i ). Here, pk i is also signed by OP, which can be used as the identity of D i . The verifiable tag vt(x) = {x, r x } is used to denote the attestation round x and the verifiable value r x from the defined reverse hash chain. In the device initialization protocol InitDev, each device is initialized with x = 0. We initialize three identity set: id i , ido i , idi i . id i is used to record the identities of devices with malicious state. ido i is used to record the identities of mobile device (or malicious device) who can not (or is unwilling to) reply its verifier. idi i is used to record the identities of newly joined devices.
Finally, we assume there is a more powerful adversary, which can change devices from malicious state to honest state to avoid being detected by conducting device resetting. we assume there is a number num to record the device resetting times initialized by the operator.
2) SWARM INITIALIZATION
Swarm initialization is used for each device D i to join swarm S by executing InitSwarm and build verifiable communication channel with each neighbor D j as shown 1 For simplicity, we do not consider how to balance the storage and computation of reverse hash chain and how to extend the reverse hash tree to support ultimate length. Actually, hybrid approaches [40] , [41] can help to balance the storage overhead and computation overhead. Also, there are some self-update way to extend the length of the reverse hash chain [42] , [43] , which even do not need the support from other security parameters.
2 more complex way in Fig. 1 .
During swarm initialization protocol, each D i takes the public/private keys pk i /sk i and the certification of the public key and device state, namely cert(pk i ) and cert(s i ) as inputs and outputs a shared secret key k ij between D i and D j . 3 During the protocol, D i needs to verify the identity and state of its neighbor device (e.g. D j ) through pk j , cert(pk j ) and cert(s j ). 4 
B. ATTESTATION PHASE
The attestation phase contains device attestation AttDev and swarm attestation AttSwarm, where AttDev is used for a device to attest another device is in the honest state, and AttSwarm is used for a verifier VRF to attest the swarm from a randomly selected device (e.g. D 0 ) in swarm S.
1) DEVICE ATTESTATION
Device attestation runs between a verifier device D i (parent) and a prover device D j (child). We extend the definition of remote attestation of [25] , which is a tuple of algorithms AttDev = {Setup, Attest, Verify}. Setup takes security parameter 1 λ as input and outputs a long-term secure attestation key k. Attest is an algorithm running at verifier, given a key k, a section token r and a device state s, outputs an attestation certification c. Verify is an algorithm running at prover, given a key k, a section token r, a device state and an attestation certification c, outputs 1 iff c is corresponding to state s , and 0 otherwise. For example, the honest state of verifier can verify whether Attest(k, r, s) = Attest(k, r, s ), where s and s are the honest and current device state of the prover, respectively. Formally, the interactive device attestation protocol between D i and D j is shown as following:
For the sake of readability, we provide the detail of AttDev protocol shown in Fig. 6 . In the protocol, D i and D j play as the verifier and prover, respectively.
The protocol works as follows: The verifier D i sends a random attestation challenge r x i to the prover D j . Actually, r x i is an element in the reverse hash chain, which can be considered as a verifiable random challenge from the verifier. Initially, the verifiable random challenge is a random number r 0 ← {0, 1} λ chosen and developed by OP. According to the one-way character of the reverse hash chain, only honest verifiers and devices who have received a correct new challenge 3 The initialized public key of each device is also used as the device identity. 4 We assume that the device identities and device states are not publicly known parameters, and devices need to get them through InitSwarm. Remark 1: Here, we do not provide the communication authenticity between the verifier and prover. We leave the device attestation authenticity and communication integrity and freshness in swarm attestation.
2) SWARM ATTESTATION
A swarm attestation is launched by a VRF. Fig. 1 provides a 9-device swarm example. Similar to the normal devices in the swarm, the VRF is initialized by a trusted party (e.g. the OP) with the InitDev protocol. However, when the current attestation round is x and the correct verifiable challenge value stored in a normal device of the swarm is vt(x), the VRF should be initialized with vt(y) where x, y ∈ Z and y > x. Usually, to save the verifiable challenge values, we have y = x + 1.
To attest a swarm, the VRF first builds secure connection with a randomly selected device (e.g. D 0 ) with the InitSwarm protocol and negotiates a shared secret key k VRF 0 for communication. Then, it will send a request challenge to the swarm accessing device, which contains a verifiable chal- 5 The Attest can be secure hash function or data compression function. lenge vt(x i ) and a random challenge θ as shown in Fig. 4 . The verifier VRF and prover D 0 work as D i and D j in the neighbor attestation, respectively. Actually, the swarm attestation protocol is a recursive protocol over the spanning tree, where each prover device will conduct device attestation over all its neighbor devices (except the parent device). The prover device (e.g. D j ) has to store the verifiable challenge of the previous phase with vt x j . When receiving the challenge from verifier D i , D j will first verify the coming of new attestation through verifying r x i = h(r
). Before returning the attestation result of the current device, the device D j will first attest all the state of its children devices and collect the statistic results of them. The statistic results contain the total number of devices attested τ j , the number of honest devices attested β j , and the set of identities of dishonest devices id j in the subtree with D j as root. In each attestation phase, we have β j = 0, τ j = 0, and id j = ∅ initially.
According to our security model, D j also needs to attest its current parent D i is honest before sending its attestation result. Otherwise, unless all the neighbor devices of D j are malicious, it will choose another honest neighbor device as parent and send the statistic attestation results of its subtree 50008 VOLUME 6, 2018 FIGURE 5. Multi-hop Attestation relationship. H is used to instead an honest node and M is used to instead a malicious. For example, H-M is use to indicate the relation between an honest parent and a malicious children.
FIGURE 6. Device attestation protocol.
to its parent. The statistic attestation results are calculated through a verifiable accumulation algorithm VerAcc, which should be run with secure hardware support. Also, the message authentication codeh j keyed with the secure secrecy key k ij of the statistic attestation results is calculated in the secure hardware. Finally, j is used for the authentication of communication of message between D i and D j .
When receiving the message from D j , D i firstly verifies the integrity of the message. If the message integrity verification is passed, D i will further conduct verifiable accumulation algorithm to securely accumulate the statistic results from all its children devices (e.g. D j in Fig. 4 ).
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The goal of swarm attestation is to allow an honest verifier VRF to accept only if the statistic attestation results are correct over all the devices taking part in the swarm attestation. 6 We provide the formal definition correctness and soundness of secure swarm attestation experiment Exp A AttSwarm that involves an adversary A. The experiment is divided into two phases and works as follows:
Initialization phase: At the beginning, the adversary A receives as input the shared secret key set k = {k 0 * , . . . , k m * }, an honest device state S = {s 0 (n), . . . , s m (n)} and device state certification set c = {c 0 , . . . , c m } of a set of (possible) 6 Since we allow a malicious device to delete the attestation result from its children device, the device taking part in the swarm attestation is the total number of attested devices collected by the verifier VRF . Attestation phase: Any prover in set D specified in the previous phase receives the current and post verifiable key materials r = r 0 , . . . , r l (challenge r l is for the current attestation) and returns the accumulated attestation results
Algorithm 1 VerAcc
For the verifier device of D i , the results of the experiment are Accept if result i = result i and Reject otherwise. 7 Based on the above experiment, we define completeness and soundness for secure swarm attestation. Analogous to the definition in interactive proof protocols: The completeness property captures the ability of some prover to convince the verifier that the statements belong to some predetermined set of true statements. The soundness property asserts that the verification procedure cannot be tricked into accepting false statements.
Definition 1 (Completeness and Soundness):
Consider an interactive swarm attestation protocol AttSwarm and states of prover P and verifier V . The protocol AttSwarm is correct if for all adversaries A, we have
The protocol is secure if for all adversaries A, we have
where State is an algorithm to get the current state of the prover P, VerAcc is an algorithm to get the statistic attestation results of the subtrees rooted at P in the swarm, and negl(λ) is a negligible function in keyed message authentication code and signature scheme.
Definition 2 (Launching Verifiability): A swarm attestation scheme is verifiable in launch if any device in the swarm can efficiently verify the coming of new attestation phase. For all adversaries A which can get all the past and current parameters (containing the secret keys), we have:
Theorem 1 (µSEDA Security): If the underlining message authentication code scheme and signature scheme are secure against selective forgery attack, the µSEDA is a secure swarm attestation scheme with completeness and soundness properties.
Proof 1 (Sketch): Since the swarm attestation µSEDA is a recursive two-part attestation protocol over the spanning tree, we need to prove that the swarm attestation of each hop with different device state is unforgeable. Thus, for one hop attestation, we distinguish the adversary in four verifier-prover (D i -D j ) cases: honest-honest, honestmalicious, malicious-honest, and malicious-malicious. In all cases, the correctness of encryption and signature for shared key establishment will guarantee that the verifier and prover can negotiate a shared secret key and verify the honesty of each device joining into the swarm.
In the first case, there are an honest verifier D i and an honest prover, which means that the prover inputs correct state to the attestation protocol. The correctness of adopted cryptographic secure message authentication code For an honest verifier and a malicious prover,the statẽ s(s = s) of prover has been changed by an adversary. Then, according to our security assumptions, only the key k is still secret to the adversary, while the other key materials, containing k ij and sk j , are leaked. Thus, the attdev protocol calculates the device attestation result c with a bit b = 0. Then, D j returns the content of the attestation result with two message authentication codeh j and to D i . Since D j is compromised, the adversary can modify the content of the message and avoid being detected by D i with . However, according to the security of message authentication code, we have Pr[mac(k , m 1 ) = mac(k, m 2 )|m 1 = m 2 ] = negl(λ), the adversary is difficult to forge the collected results that can pass the verification of D i .
For the attestation between a malicious verifier and an honest prover, the malicious verifier is difficult to launch new attestation phase because of the Launching Verifiability property, which we will prove later. The verifier may modify the message to pass the authentication on , or even selectively drop the collected attestation from D j . On one hand, definition 1 contains the situation that malicious verifiers can drop attestation result from any its direct prover. On the other hand, thanks to the verifiable accumulation algorithm based on the secure hardware, it will verify the integrity of attestation results onh j . Similar to the malicious device D j in above case, it is difficult to forge the attestation results.
Finally, for the attestation with both malicious verifier and malicious prover, the malicious verifier may also launch new attestation phase and change all the message content on demand. In this case, the security of attestation relies only on the hardware-based secure protection. On the prover side, we assume the secret key k is not compromised, and the integrity of the attestation results guaranteed by keyed message authentication codeh j is authentic. Since we have
, it is difficult for both D i and D j to forge an input which can pass the integrity check of VerAcc.
This means that, in the multi-hop swarm attestation, the final swarm attestation results are complete and sound. Thus, our swarm attestation is secure.
Theorem 2 (Launching Verifiability of µSEDA): If the underlining hash function is collision resistant, the µSEDA is Launching Verifiable.
Proof 2: The Launching verifiability is actually from the security of one-way hash chain based on collision resistant hash function. If the length of underlying hash chain is n + 1 and the current verifiable challenge is r x , the adversary knows all the past and current verifiable challenge {r 0 , . . . , r x }. The adversary will find a verifiable challenge in the set r y ∈ {r x+1 , . . . , r n } with negligible probability. Otherwise, the adversary can compute r x+1 = h y−x−1 (r y ) with nonnegligible probability, which violates the security of collision resistant property of the underlying hash function.
Remark 2: According to our security analysis, a malicious device may selectively delete the attestation result from its direct children, which will prevent some malicious devices from being detected. Thus, we allow provers to verify the honesty of their verifiers and change their direct verifier to honest one. It introduces some communication and computation overhead of attestation to avoid the selective attestation results deletion attack.
To analyze the affection of malicious nodes in a swarm, we assume that the probability of randomly compromised nodes in the N -node swarm is p. We also assume that each internal node in the network topology has identical number of children nodes, and the number is α(1 ≤ α) in different swarms. We provide the affection of the selective attestation results deletion attack over SEDA [24] . We call the authentication strategy of SEDA and our scheme unilateral authentication strategy and bilateral authentication strategy, respectively. In unilateral authentication strategy scheme, we assume the malicious verifier will privately eliminate the attestation result from its malicious children. If P is defined as escape ratio (the ratio that a malicious device escapes from being detected) and it is equal to the number of non collected malicious nodes divided by the number of malicious nodes in the swarm, we have the malicious node escape ratio P uni for unilateral authentication scheme.
Also, we get the malicious node escape ratio P bi for bilateral authentication scheme with different children number of each node .
VII. PERFORMANCE
We evaluate the computation, storage and communication cost of our scheme and provide comparison with SEDA scheme. In our evaluation, we consider the affect of both mobility and compromise of the devices. 8 
COMPUTATION COST
Since we consider a dynamic network topology, we compare the computation cost of devices in different situations. Different from the computation cost of a VRF in SEDA [24] , the verification of a valid VRF in our scheme could rely on the security of hash chain, which means that the computation cost is only a hash. For static swarm topology, to conduct 8 The computation overhead of accessing point device is 2M + S. attestation between a neighbor device, a child device needs to compute and verify 2 MAC from its parent device, and compute 2 MAC and send them to the parent device. Here we only consider the expensive cryptographic operations and omit the efficient bit string comparison cost. Since we provide mutual attestation to mitigate the selective attestation results deletion attack of malicious devices, our computation cost here is two time that of SEDA [24] . For low dynamic swarm topology, we consider a dynamic device which will not move out the communication range of its previous neighbor and it can still be attested by its neighbor with the shared secret key negotiated in the device join phase. Then, before communicating with parent device, a mobile device only needs to compute a new MAC with new shared secret key. Then the device can conduct mutual attestation with the new parent, which is identical to that in static swarm. We need to remark that, if the mobile device has finished the attestation of parent device, it will have to conduct additional 2 MACs computation. For EDSA, we consider the extend protocol described by the authors, where SEDA can generate a virtual spanning tree and there is a routing mechanism used to deliver the attestation messages to the original attestation parent of each mobile device. Then, the device needs to compute an additional MAC to provide message authentication using the shared secret key with the new neighbor and the neighbor needs to verify the MAC. Thus, the computation cost before routing the attestation to the original attestation is (4 + 2x)M, where x is the routing hops. Different from low dynamic swarm topology, high dynamic ones need additional node identity verification based on signature.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
Software integrity of devices is of great importance for largescale, dynamic, and self-organization swarm. In this paper, we study the identity attestation of compromised devices over dynamic swarm topology and design an interactive swarm attestation scheme. Moreover, based on the one-way hash chain, a verifiable solution for the new attestation launching solution is proposed. Furthermore, theoretical and practical analysis prove that our scheme is secure and efficient in dynamic swarm topology. In the future, we will consider swarm attestation with public key protocol to reduce the key deployment overhead. Also, since the malicious nodes may provide incorrect results which may affect the attestation result of some honest node. Thus, how to remove the attestation of malicious nodes in previous attestation is also important in our future work. 
